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BAR BRIEFS
property. Said stockholder then formed the Glen Ullin Trust and
conveyed the property to said Trust Co., which agreed to manage it for
him. Plaintiffs, as stockholders and directors of the Glen Ullin Trust,
brought action to quiet title. HELD: for plaintiff. An individual
who is a stockholder but not a director of a corporation, in absence of
fraud may purchase property lost by the company's failure to redeem at
execution sale. Such individual is under no fiduciary relation with the
creditors of the company and no constructive trust arises in favor of the
creditors of the company.
L. R. Baird, Receiver for Citizens Bank v. Northern Savings Bank
and American National Bank. T, the owner of land, simultaneously
gave three mortgages, the first of which was assigned to defendant
Northern Savings bank. T later gave a fourth mortgage to plaintiff
bank, and delivered to said bank a warranty deed for said land. Plain-
tiff bank gave T a contract to reconvey on certain conditions, among
which T was to pay taxes subsequent to 1919. Plaintiff bank paid the
192o and 21 taxes and recorded the deed. The contract was not re-
corded, and defendants had no knowledge of it until this trial. De-
fendant Northern Savings bank foreclosed its first mortgage, bid the
property in for the full amount of indebtedness, and sheriff's certificate
was issued to it. It paid plaintiff bank for 192o and 21 taxes but 22
taxes appeared of record as paid by owner. Sheriff's certificate was
assigned to defendant American bank and sheriff's deed issued. Plain-
tiff bank closed in 1924 and receiver demanded from defendants re-
imbursement for the payment of 1922 taxes. Defendant refused.
Plaintiff as receiver brought this action in equity to have the warranty
deed given to Citizens bank declared a mortgage and to decree the
taxes paid by grantee a lien on the land. From judgment for plain-
tiff receiver, defendant appealed. HELD: Reversed. A mortgagee who
purchased mortgaged property in good faith on a foreclosure sale with-
out paying any money except costs of foreclosure but crediting the
amount of the bid on mortgagor's debt is a subsequent purchaser for




A workman, employed as a night watchman, was found in a tool
house,' dead. The evidence disclosed that he had voluntarily gone into
such tool house to sleep, and that the closing of the doors of such tool
house had caused the exhaust from a gasoline engine to accumulate,
death resulting from carbon monoxide gas. The facts presented showed
him in a sleeping position, his hat hanging on the wall, and his raincoat
pulled over him. HELD: There was nothing to indicate that the
deceased went into the tool house for the purpose of performing any
service for his employer; that he was evidently seeking shelter from
the discomforts of the weather; that the voluntary exposure to the
poisonous gas for purely personal purposes was a departure from his
line of duty, and dependents are not entitled to compensation.- Union
Indemnity Co. v. Malley, v. S. W. (2nd) 923 (Texas).
BAR BRIEFS
It was the duty of an office employee, during the noon hour, to
go to the postoffice for his employer's mail, examine same and telephone
orders demanding immediate attention, then going on home for his lunch
and bringing the mail with him upon his return. On a certain day the
employee, while returning to work by the usual route between his home
and the office, fell on the sidewalk and was injured. HELD: The
case does not fall within the exceptions entitling claimant to compensa-
tion for injury in the course of employment. It is true that, in going
to the postoffice from his place of work claimant was attending to
part of his daily work; but after reaching home the service to be
rendered ceased. He was then at leisure to eat his lunch and return
to work at his own time, so long as it was within the limits of his noon
recess, by such route as he should select, and by such means of con-
veyance as he desired. The carrying of the mail on his return was
incidental. The primary object was to return to his work. Award for
compensation reversed.-Rawson's Case, 14o Atlantic 365 (Maine).
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
The first of the re-statements of the law to be offered in final
form by the American Law Institute covers 177 Sections of the law of
contracts. This work was completed at the April meeting of the In-
stitute. Our information is that copies of the re-statement may be
obtained from the American Law Institute, 3400 Chestnut St., Phila-
delphia, at a cost of $1.25. To show the method of treatment, we quote
the following:
Topic B. Manifestation of Assent
Section 20. Manifestation of Mutual Assent Necessary. A mani-
festation of mutual assent by the parties is essential to its formation
and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be done with the
intent to do those acts; but, except as qualified by Sections 55, 71 and
72, neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor real or
apparent intent that the promises shall be legally binding is essential.
Comment
a. Mutual assent to the formation of informal contracts is opera-
tive only to the extent that it is manifested. Morever, if the manifesta-
tion is at variance with the mental intent, subject to the slight excep-
tion stated in Section 71, it is the expression which is controlling. Not
mutual assent but a manifestation indicating such assent is what the law
requires. Nor is it essential that the parties are conscious of the legal
relations which their words or acts give rise to. It is essential, how-
ever, that the acts manifesting assent should be done intentionally.
That is, there must be a conscious will to do those acts; but it is not
material what induces the will. Even insane persons may so act; but
a somnambulist could not.
Illustrations
i. A offers to sell B his library at a stated price, forgetting that
his family Bible, which he did not intend to sell, was in the library. B
accepts the offer. B is entitled to have the Bible.
2. A orally promises to sell B a book in return for B's promise
to pay $5. A and B both think such promises are not binding unless
in writing. Nevertheless there is a contract.
